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ABSTRACT
This paper explores the economic factors which determine the variation of
research effort across firms. The intra—industry coefficient of variation of
research intensity is much larger than those of traditional factors. We show
that this important fact is consistent with the theoreticalargument that know-
ledge possesses unique economic characteristics, and that the demand for research
depends both on the parameters of the production function for knowledge andon
the ability of the firm to appropriate the benefits from theknowledge it produces.
We propose and implement a framework for decomposing the observedintra—industry
variance In research intensity into three components: demand inducement,a firm—
specific structural parameter, and errors in the observed variables. The main
empirical findings are that errors in the variables (especially research) are
important, that very little of the structural variance in research intensity is
accounted for by demand inducement, and that the bulk of the variance is related
to differences in the firm—specific parameter. Both the theoretical andempirical
analysis indicate that it is not reasonable to treat the demand for research ina
manner analogous to the demand for traditional Inputs, including capital. Sub-
stantially richer models are required to provide insight into the structure of in-
centives driving the demand for research.
Ariel Pakes
Harvard University
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Introduction
The recent interest of economists in the process of techno-
logical change derives in part from the unique economic charac-
teristics of knowledge. These characteristics, discus8ed formally
by Arrow (1962), indicate the likelihood of a divergence between the
private and social rates of return to research resources devoted to
producing new knowledge. It should not be surprising that these
same characteristics also affect the derived demand for research by
profit—oriented firms. This paper explores the economic factors
which determine the distribution of research effort across firms.
These factors are known as cross—sectional inducement mechanisms.
There are three sets of competing explanations in the literature,
each emphasizing a different aspect of the problem.
Schmookler (1966), and Griliches and Schmookler (1963),
emphasize the importance of expected market size as an inducement to
researcheffort.They recognize that the cost of reproducing the
knowledge generated by research is low relative to the original cost
of producing it, and that the private return to research therefore
varies directly with the number of units of output in which the
knowledge is embodied, or the size of the market. Differences across
12
Industries in the cost of producing knowledge are downplayed, on
the argument that scientific knowledge is sufficiently well
developed to make the supply for new industrial knowledge highly
elastic at the same level of costs for all industries. Rosenberg
(1963, 1969 and 1974), while granting the importance of market size,
argues that the body of scientific and engineering knowledge grows
at different rates in different areas and that the application of
such knowledge to industries is more circumscribed than Griliches
and Schmookler suggest. He concludes that these differences in the
cost of producing industrial knowledge, or technological opportunity
are a major determinant of the observed distribution of research
effort. Schumpeter (1950), on the other hand, argues that research
effort generates temporary monopoly power for the innovating firm.
Since knowledge has a low reproduction cost, any economic unit aware
of the information embodied in an innovation can exploit it. Hence
the private benefits from the production of knowledge must be a
result of quasi—rents accruing to the producer of the innovation.
The key to this process is the ability of the firm to appropriate
the monetary benefits from the knowledge it produces. Schumpeter
therefore emphasizes the determinants of the degree of appropriability,
such as entrepreneurial ability, industrial market structure, and the
general institutional framework (including patent rights) inwhich
the firm operates. Finally, any study which specifies empirical
measures of research effort and their relationship to economically
useful knowledge must give careful attention to the influence of3
measurement and specification errors on the observed distribution
of research expenditures.
These different issues in cr088—sectional inducement remain
unresolved and unintegrated into a general framework. This paper
presents a unified framework for analyzing interfirm differences in
research expenditures which takes account of the unique characteris-
tics of knowledge as an economic commodity. The model postulates
Cobb—Douglas production relationships and results in equations
determining the intensity of use of all inputs. Traditional factor
intensities in such a framework depend only on production function
parameters. The optimum research intensity depends, in addition, on
expected growth rates and appropriability. The intra—industry
coefficient of variation in research intensity in the comprehensive
cross—section of American manufacturing firms examined is more than
seven times as large as the coefficient of variation in traditional
factor intensities (1.81 compared with 0.24). This in itself
supports the theoretical arguments which indicate that research
demandisdetermined by a more complex set of factors than the demand
for traditional inputs and suggests that the inducement mechanisms
described in the literature do discriminate among firms.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 specifies the
production function for knowledge which underlies the cost side of
the determinant8 of research demand. In Section 2 a model of the
private returns to new Industrial knowledge is presented. It is
shown that the cost of production and the returns from the use of new4
industrial knowledge jointly determine the private rate of return
to research resources and, in a profit—oriented economy, the
research intensity of the firm. Section 3 specifies the structure of
the stochastic terms. Section 4 applies the model to an examination
of the intra—industry variance in research intensity. Concluding
remarks provide a brief summary of results and a discussion of
implications.
1. Production Relationships
This paper is limited to an analysis of an extended Cobb—
Douglas production function. Research resources enter the production
process by raising the productivity of traditionalfactors of
production in a disembodied maimer. Problems involvedin the
construction of R&D variables have made this simple type of speci-
fication the most widely used framework in the empirical analysisof
the role of research resources in production, and in this respectthe
data base used here is no exception.1 The general limitationsof
this type of framework have been ably discussed by Griliches (1973
and 1975), and we will not repeat them here. Our specification
differs from the one chosen by Griliches (1975) in two respects.
First, we decompose "research resources" into its componentinputs,
research labor and research capital. Second, we explicitly incorpor-
ate both an R&D gestation lag and a rate ofobsolescence of produced5
knowledge. Both of these parameters become determinants of the
R&D intensity of the firm.
The following discussion sets out the basic set of production
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and all firm andtimesubscripts have been omitted for convenience.
Sincethe stock of knowledge K is an unobservable variable, its units
are arbitrary. Hence, without loss of generality it has been
normalized such thataone percent increase in K raises output by
one percent.
The generation of knowledge is summarized by its production
function:
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where6
=thegross-increment in own-produced knowledge at t
A1 =aconstant, which may be both firm and time
specific
Lte =researchlabor services at t -8
C0 =researchcapital services at t -8
U =themelagbetweOn the time research is
undertaken and its embodiment in the traditional
production processes of the firm
Equation (2) states that knowledge is produced by research
labor and research capital and that the form of the production function
is Cobb-Douglas.2 Since the development of either a new technique or
new product requires the use of research resources over an extended
period of time, one would expect a distributed lag relationship to
connect the deployment of research resources and the resultant
increases in the firm's productivity.3 Since our data cannot sustain
an investigation of this distributed lag, we use the simplification of
a mean lag which applies to all units of research resources equally.
It should also be noted that we assi.ne the parameters a and b to
be the same for all firms in a given industry. These, plus the
firm-specific constant A1, are indices of what Scherer (1965) calls
the "technological opport'unity" of the industry. Variation in A1,
a and b reflects differences in the cost of producing new industrial
knowledge, or in Rosenberg's terms (1969), differences in the "supply
side" determinants of the rate of technical progress.7
Assuming geometric decay of knowledge at the rate of and
taking the growth rates of research capital and research labor to be
constant both during and prior to theperiod of analysis (as required
by our data), the net increment to
knowledge kis:4
=Ae)t-lKt (3)
where A =A1L0C0eaL+)e,and a hat denotes a rate of growth.
Solving this differential equation andnoting that urn Kt =0,the





This concludes the specification ofthe production
relationships. However, the next section willrequire expressions for
the reduction in unit costsattributable to an increase in research
labor andresearchcapital. Assuming that the firm is a cost minimizer
facing fixed input prices, the unitcost function associated with (1)
can be expressed as
h(w,pH) =
K (5)
where Z represents unitcosts, and w and denote the (fixed)
wage and rental rates for traditional labor and
capita] services,
respectively. Substituting (4) into (5) anddifferentiating the cost8
functionat time t +0 withrespect to research labor and research
capital services at time t, we obtain
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2. Private Rates of Return to Research Resources
and Optimal Research Input Intensities
In the American economy the bulk of industrial research is
performed by firms. If these firms are motivated by potential
profits, the level of their research effort will bedetermined by the
expected net income generated by investment in research resources.
As a result, the large observed intra—industry variance in research
intensity should be attributable to the variance in the expected
private returns to research. The objective factorswhich could cause
differences in the expected net income generated by the use of
research resources are: 1) variation in the costs of research inputs;
2) differences in the productivity of research resourcesin generat-
ing usable industrial knowledge; and 3) differencesin the ability to
derive monetary benefits from a given unit of produced knowledge.
Variation in costs of research inputs will be incorporated
into the model and discussed in the next section. Inconnection with9
the productivity of research resources, the basic model assumes that
all firms in a given "industrytt produce a single homogeneous output
subjectto the same productionconditions (as specified in the previous
section),and the model is tested separately on each "industry" in
our data set. Consequently, differences in the expected returnsfrom
research beyond those caused by differencesin the cost of research
inputswill be associated with differences in the ability to derive
monetary benefits from a given unit of produced knowledge. However,
the industries in the data set are defined quite broadly, so there
could be some intraindustry differences in the output elasticity of
research resources. At this stage, we do not separate these supply
side differences from those in the ability to capture the monetary
benefits from knowledge. We return to this problem in the concluding
remarks.
The difficulty in specifying a mechanism which determines
the stream of private benefits that accrue to new industrial knowledge
is a result of the fact (stressed by Arrow, 1962) that knowledge has
no, or a very small, cost of reproduction. Hence, the realized social
rate of return to an innovation will vary directly with the number of
units of output in which is it embodied. However, the fact that
knowledge has no cost of reproduction also has implications for the
characteristics of the private returns accruing to the producers
of an innovation. Since any economic unit aware of the information
embodied in the innovation can exploit it, the private benefits from
the production of industrial knowledge must be a result of quasi-
rents, or temporary monopolies, accruing to the producer of the10
innovation.5The strength of these monopolies, that is, the abilities
of firms to appropriate the benefits from the knowledge which they
have developed, will determine the private return to research resources
and therefore the research intensity of finns. In short, the private
return to the development of a new cost-reducing technique will depend
on the number of units of output embodying this new knowledge and the
fraction of the cost reduction attributable to the innovation which
is appropriatedbythe innovating firm.
Webeginby reviewing the maximum appropriability environment,"
first described by Arrow (1962) and subsequently adapted to determine
the rate of return to research resources by Nordhaus (1969b). Consider
a constant cost industry in competitive equilibrium and an innovation
which reduces the cost of production for the f inns in the industry
and only for such finns. The maximum appropriabi]ity environment is
basedon the assumptionthat the innovator patents the innovation
costlessly and leases the cost-reducing technique to all firms in the
industry (including itself), subject to the condition that the final
productmust sell at auniformpriceto consuming units. The lease
can be defined in terms of a royalty per unit of output produced with
the innovation, p0. The lessor acts as a monopolist and sets the
initial royalty so as to maximize profits subject to the constraint
that the royalty plus the new cost of production (p0+
Z1)
is less
than orequalto the pre— innovation cost of production (Z0 =P0).
Invirtually all cases the profit—maximizing royalty at the date




Since the maximum appropriability environment assumes that
the lessor will capture the direct potential benefits from all firms
in the industry, the revenue collected in the firstyear of the
innovation in that appropriability environment is the shaded region
in Figure 1, or p0Q= ZQ whereQdenotesthe industry output
in the year the innovation is introduced. Arrow does not consider
the entire stream of revenues accruing to an innovation, nor does he
allow for the possibility of less than full appropriability. We-now
extend Arrow's discussion to allow for non-maximal, firm specific
appropriability environments and for the calculation of the entire
revenue stream accruing to the innovation.
Let be the fraction of industry output from which firm
1receivesroyalties on its innovation of age r,p be the royalty
per unit of output, and Bit be total revenues accruing to the
innovation in year r. Then
B.0 =p.0k.Q
=Zk.QQ (7)
and the discounted value of the stream of revenues generated by the
innovation (II)is
It=fBite_ttdr =fpitkjtQe_rtdt (8)
where r is the discount rate.Figvre 1
$





The specification of non-maximal, firm-specific appropriability
environments is based on the following two assumptions:
1. It is easier, or less costly, for a firm to capture the
benefits of the knowledge it produces through embodiment in its own
output (internal appropriation) than through embodiment in the output
of other firms.
2. The revenues accruing to an innovation decline with the age
of the innovation.
Internal appropriation is less costly because of the
difficulties involved in establishing a market for information.
First, prospective purchasers do not know the value of the information
before it is purchased, and the information cannot be secured in
divisible quantities. Second, the purchaser of the information may
resell it, or "reshape" and sell it, thereby undermining the original
seller's monopoly position. As a result, the information is not
likely to be sold to all potential users and the innovator will not
be able to capture the full benefits of the information from those
firms which do purchase it.7 By contrast, internal appropriati.on of14
the information is not subject to these marketing constraints, at
least not to the same degree.
There are three factors which may cause revenues accruing to
the innovation to decline over time. First, new techniques will be
developed which either displace or partly substitute for the original
innovation.Second, the use of the information in anyproductive way
will reveal and spread it, in part by inspection of the resultant
output and the mobility of personnel among firms. This will tend to
erode the monopoly power of the innovator, thereby reducing either the
unit royalty which can be charged or the part of industry output. from
which royalties accrue, or both. Third, the accumulation (by a single
firm or group of collusive firms) of small innovations over time is
equivalent (in terms of cost reduction) to a large innovation. This
will eventually violate the Arrow royalty condition, which in turn
reduces the unit royalty that accrues to at least one of the
innovations.
In order to maintain a specification which is both as general
as possible and consistent with the preceding two assumptions, we let
÷k.Q. +k.—6tQ. —Sti it iir
p. k.=(p.e)e —= Ze — (9) 1T1T15
n
where k. =0by construction (n is the numberoffirms in the
i=11
industry) and denotesthe expected output of firmiat time r.
Revenues in period r become
T k+k.
B. =p.k. Q =(ZeJT)e 1Q. (10) it 1tiTt it
We will interpret the parameters in the following manner:
k+k.
6 is the rate of decay in the unit royalty, e is the proportion
of firm i's share of industry output from which the firm receives
this royalty, and ek is the (geometric) mean of this proportion over
all firms in the industry. However, it is impossible to distinguish
k+k.
empirically between a rate of decay in the proportion e and 6,
or between a firm specific component in the rate of decay and eki.
Since appropriable revenues alone suffice to determine the private
benefits from an innovation, it is immaterial whether the firm specific
component applies to the royalty (the price side of revenues) or to
the number of units from which the firm receives these royalties (the
quantity side of revenues). Hence, these relationships may be
interpreted as saying that the revenues generated by a given innovation
of age t depend upon: 1) the importance of the innovation .Z; 2) the
age of the innovation t (through the rate of obsolescence of the
przvate returns from knowledge 6); 3) a firm-specific structural
parametereki which determines the extent to which the firmcan
monopolize the information produced by its research resources; and16
4)the expected output of the innovating firm becauseof the
relative ease of internal appropriation.8
To obtain the present value of revenues generated by the
employment of the marginal unitofresearch labor at time t
substitute (6a), (7), and (9) into (8). Setting the price of output
equal to one (as it implicitly is in our data) and recalling from
(6a) that the cost reduction does not occur until 0 years after the
employmentof the unit ofresearch labor, we have
+k. -(5+r)T
ra i. gr =. t— %.eldT 80
where g is the expected rate of growth of output of firm i.
Equating ItL to the wage rate for research labor (wy), taking a
first order Taylor's expansion of log(5+r-g) around log(6+r) and















andP is the price of research capital services.
Several features of equations. (ha) and (llb) are worth noting.
First, since the returns from both research labor and research capital
are derived from the returns to industrial knowledge, any factor which
affects the returns to knowledge will influence the optimal intensities
of both the research variables. It is this important fact which
permits econometric identification of the relative importance of the
unobserved structural parameter (kr) in determining the research
intensities of firms.
Second, equations (ila) and (llb) indicate that the firm's
employment of research resources will vary directly with its
expected market size and its "appropriability base," and inversely
with the rate of obsolescence and the rate of discount. The
importance of expected market size in determining the optimal level
of research resources follows directly from the fact that knowledge18
10
has no cost of reproduction. Schmookler (1966) demonstrated the
empirical importance of this point at an inter-industry level, while
Griliches (1958) has shown the dominant influence of expected
market size in determining the relative social rates of return to
hybrid seed innovations.
The structural parameter k1) reflects the extent to which
a firm can capture the benefits from the cost-reducing innovations it
develops. This will be determined jointly by the market structure of
the industry (e.g., similarity of firms in terms of market power,
production processes employed, research orientation, ease of imitation),
the abilities of the entrepreneur or manager of the firm, and the
general institutional setting in which the firm operates--factors
associated with the Schumpeterian tradition.
Third, for a given value of initial revenues accruing to an
innovation, the higher is the rate of obsolescence (5), the smaller
thetotal value of private benefits from the innovation and therefore
theless intense will be the research effort. Moreover, since research
produces a stock (knowledge) whose benefits accrue over the future,
the optimal research intensity will vary inversely with the rate of
discount. Finally, the longer the gestation lag (0), the larger
isthe influence of the future in determining the returns to RD, and
hence the more important the effect of expected growth on the optimal
R.PDintensity.12
The model presented here posits a set of firms which produce
knowledge from research resources, and produce output by combining19
this knowledge with traditional factors of production. The price of
output is determined by the cost of traditional factors plus quasi-
rents generated by temporary monopoly power over the information
produced by the research resources. It is important to realize that
there will be no private benefits from the employment of research
resources without some degree of monopoly power. Theunique
characteristicsof knowledge as a corvnodity imply that the private
rate of return to research resources must be determined jointly by
the parcvneters of the production function for knowledge and the ability
of the firm to internalie the benefits from the knowledge it produces.
Thispoint seems to be incompletely understood in the literature.
3. Structure and Identification of the
Three Equation Model
The basic structural form of the model consists of factor demand
equations for research labor, research capital and traditional labor.
By adding the relevant stochastic terms, this section converts the
model into an estimable form. Actually, two stochastic specifications
are investigated. The first specification, which imposesa fairly
stringent set of assumptions on the properties of the errors, produces
a simple three equation model and a transparent identification scheme.
The second specification relaxes the more stringent assumptions on the
errors, and enables both a more complete set of tests of the model and
an investigation of the intertemporal stability of the appropriability
parameter. The cost of this generality, however, is a more complicated20
six equationmodel. In this section we describe the three equation
model. The empirical results for this model and a summary of the
additional information in the six-equation model are presented in the
next section.
Letting asterisks denote the optimal levels of each variable
and adding the factor demand equation for traditional labor to (ha)
and (llb), the structural form of the model is written as:
log W+ logL* -logQ* =log +3g*+
k1 (12a)
log P +logC* -logQ* =log +cg*
-'k. (12b)
log w +logN* -logQ* =log5 (l2c)
It is assumedthata firm's expected growth rate equals its
averge past growth rate plus a component which reflects common
expectational changes in the trend of industry demand.13 That is:
g =g+ fori =1... n (13)
where j. is the average past growth rate of firm i, and tg is
the commonly held, expected difference between the average past and
future growth rates.
The variable in (12) denoted by Q* is expected output, i.e.,
the value of output upon which input decisions are made. We follow
Mundlak and Hoch (1965) in assuming "partial transmission" of the error
in output to the input decision-making process. Letting the21
superscript
°denotethe observed value of a variable, we have:
Y112h1 = Heq q
and
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Inthe context of the "simultaneity" literature, the partial
transmissionassumption is quite general, encompassing both the full
transmission assumption of Marschak and Andrews (1944) and the zero
transmission assumption of Zellner et al. (1966) as special cases. 14
The disturbance
TIq
shouldbe interpreted as resulting from firm
specificdifferences in management andtechnology, andthe effect of
transitory factors which areknownbefore input decisions are made.
The termVqI onthe other hand, results from transitory factors which
are not knownbeforeinput decisions ate made, such as machine
breakdowns, and from measurement error.
Theobserved level of each factor of production differs from
its optimal level by an error which has two components, a decision
component resulting from an inoptimal choice of factor levels and a





where E(e.) =0and V(c.) =forj =c,L,n.
What remains is to specify the covariance structure of the
various error components, and it is in this specification that the
three and six equation models differ.
It is quite conmon to assume that
Vq
is independent of the
errors in the various factors)5 That is,
E(VqCj) =0forj =c,,n (16)'
The reasoning is twofold. First, since there are independent measures
of each variable, there is no reason to expect any correlation between
their respective measurement errors. Second, the non-measurement
componentof vis due to acts of nature such as weather conditions q
andmachine performance (see Zeilner et al. [1966]), whereas the
decision component of the factor errors occurs before the realization
of
Vq
and is due to human (management) error. Assumption (16) is
accepted a priori in the three equation model but is subjected to a
test in the six equation model described below.
The three equation model also assumes a zero covariance among
the errors in the various factors. That is:
E(cc.) =0for p jandp,j =c,Z,n (17)23
Since the underlying assumptions of behavioral models which result in
the error structure in (17) are not very persuasive, the six equation
model will allow for free correlation among the factor errors. The
advantage of the three equation model based on (17) is its simplicity
and, as the six equation results will demonstrate, the bias due to the
simplification in (17) is minimal.16
For the remainder of the analysis it will prove convenient
to redefine all variables as deviations from their sample means,but
for simplicity we leave the notation unchanged. With thisunder-
standing, substitutionof (13), (14) and (15) into (12) yields the
following system of equations in observed or manifest dependent
variables:
1ogw+logL°_lOgQ° =ci+kj+cc_Vq (18a)
log PC +logC° -logQ°= cli+ +- (l8b)
log w +logN° -logQ°= - vs (18c)
System (18a) -(18c)formsa setof factor share equations for research
labor and capital, and traditional labor with the structureof the
stochastic terms incorporated.
Assumingthatthe appropriability parameter, k, is
—17
uncorrelatedwith the various error components and with g ,a24
maximum likelihood estimation technique provides consistent and
asymptoticallyefficient estimates of a and of the variance-
covariance matrix of disturbance 1*, where
2 2 2+ + k cq
2 2 2 22
°kq °k90q
(19)
2 2 22 a a
q q qn -
Theidentification of the various components from (19) is
straightforward.Any factorwhich affects the returns to theproduction
of knowledgewill affect the optimal intensities of both research
resources. Consequently, the covariance between the disturbances in
the two research intensity equations will capture a. However, this
covariance also picks up any measurement or expectational error in
output (Vq) Since the traditional labor intensity equation will also
contain the error in output, a can be identified by the covariance
between the research intensity and the traditional labor demand
equations. Finally, the variances of the errors in the research
resource variables are calculated as the residual portion of the
research intensity equations. It is also clear from (19) that if25
2 0, then the estimate of will be biased upwards or downwards
according as 0. However, theconsistencyof the estimated
isunaffected by any correlationamong the factor errors.
Letus return to the variance in research intensity. The
research expenditures of a firm are calculated as the sum of the firm's
expenditures on research labor and research capital. That is:
=wL°+PC° (20) r c
Since we define research capital toinclude all RD expenditures other
thanpayments to scientists and engineers, (20) is an identity.
Analogously, we define the optimal level of research expenditures as
the sum of the optimal levels of expenditures on research capital and
research labor:
R* =wL*+PC (21) r c
Substituting(12a) and(l2b) into (21), and using (20), (21) and the
errorcomponents in (15), the observed research intensity can be
expressedin terms of the structural parameters of the model as:





Equation (22) is definitionally equal to a linear combination
of (18a) and (l8b). Hence, any two linearly independent combination
of these three equations contain all the information available in the
data. The form of the data made it easier to estimate an equation
for research expenditures than for research capital. Therefore, the
system of factor share equations which will be estimated is:
log R° -logQ°= + + + (1- 1I))c+
vq
(23a)
logW+ logL° -logQ°= k1+ LCc) (23b)
log w + log N° -logQ°= - (23c)







where may be consistently estimated by the antilog of the constant
term in (23b). Of course, all the comments that applied to (18) and
(19) apply equally to (23) and (24).
The parameters from (23) and (24) [or from (18) and (19)1
permit a decomposition of the variance in research intensity into
three components: 1) variance due to differences in the expected growth
rate of the internal appropriability base of the firm (a2a)
2) variance caused by differences in the appropriability parameter27
(at) which determines the private benefits accruing to a cost—reducing
innovation,.given the internal appropriability base of the firm; and
3) variancecaused by measurement and decision errors in research
resourcesand in expected output.
In addition (24) allows for one formal and one informal test
of the underlying model. The system canbeestimated with and without
the imposition of a zero covariance term between the disturbances from
equations(23b) and(23c). Under the null hypothesis that the -
assumptionsof the model are true against the alternative that
0 and/or 0, the ratio of the constrained to the
unconstrained log likelihood ratio will distribute asymptotically as
2 18 .
X1.
Also, of course, there are non-negativity restrictions on
all the estimated variances. Since these restrictions are equivalent
to a ranking of the elements of the covariance matrix, and as such
are not guaranteed by our estimating procedure, the non-negativity
conditionsconstitute an informaltest of the model.
4. Empirical Results
Thissection begins with a brief description of the scope and
the sources of the data, and then presents and interprets the empirical
19
results. The data were gathered jointly by the National Science28
Foundation and the Bureau of the Census. They contain individual
company information on REED expenditures, the number of scientists and
engineers, total employment and sales--all based on the 1957-1965 annual
NSF-Census REED Surveys--and a variety of other company economic indica-
tors based on a match with the 1958 and 1968 Census of Manufacturers
and Enterprise Statistics. The data include observations on one level
year value and a corresponding growth rate for most variables.
The sample used here consists of 433 large (1000+ employees)
firms which account for 48 percent of all RFD performed in American
industry in 1963, and 78 percent of all RED excluding Aircraft and
Missiles.20 The firms are broken down into four broadindustry groups
-—Chemicals and Petroleum, Electrical and Communications Equipment,
Fabricated Metal Products and Machinery, and Motor Vehicles and other
TransportEquipment--and the analysis isperformed on each of these
industriesseparately.
The data contain two measures of j, the average past growth
rate in value added. The first is a nine-year (logarithmic) average of
the past growth rate in sales (11).whilethe second is calculated as
the difference between the logarithms of value added in 1963 and 1957
divided by 6 Both and differ from j by pure
measurementerror, but contains an additional error due to the29
discrepancy between the true past growth rates in value added and
sales.The information in both these measures can be incorporated




E(v)= E(v.g) = E(v12) = 0
and
V(v) =2 for j=1,2
That is, the observed measures of and g2 are both subject to
classical measurement error and the two measurement errors are assumed
to be uncorrelated.21
Equations (23), (24) and (25) fully specify the form of the
model to be estimated. Before presenting the empirical results,
however, exogenous information is used to derive a plausible range
for a. There are two reasons for our special interest in c. Recall
that a =(l/(r+cS]+ewhere r, S and 0 are the discount rate,
the decay rate in appropriable revenues accruing to the innovation,
and the mean lag between the outlay of research resOurces and the
beginning of the associated revenue stream. The parameters cS and 830
are key parameters in calculating the private rate of return to
knowledge producing activities. Second, a comparison of exogenous
information on the value of c' with the direct estimates here will
provide an informal test of the assumptions of the model (see fn.
17). The estimates of cSand0 are taken from Pakes and Schankerman
(1978). The approximate ranges for t5and0 are 0.18 -0.36and 1.2
-2.5(years), respectively. Based on a discount factor of 0.10,
these estimates provide a fairly narrow a priori range for the
coefficient 0.ofbetween 3.3 and 6.1, which in turn will be compared
to the actual estimates obtained here.
All models were estimated using a full information maximum
likelihood technique developed by Jireskog (l973b).
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The empirical
results for the three equation model are presented in Table 1.1. The
2 . . . valuein line 8 tests the zero covariance constraint described
earlier. None of the four industries had a test statistic with a
surprising value. Treating the xdeviatefor the various industries
as drawings from independent x2distributions,and summing over
industries, results in the more powerful ()/4teststatistic. The
observed value of ()/4 was .744, while, the one and five percent
critical values of a ()/4 deviate are 3.33 and 2.37, respectively.
Alsonote that twenty-four free parameters with a prornon-negativityTABLE 1





































































!fAsterisks denote error variances
negativity constraints.
=cov(12).
which violate a priorinon-32
constraints were estimated. Of these, only one was negative and
this one (inthe fourth industry) was less than one standard
deviation from zero.
All of the estimated a coefficients are of the right sign and
statistically significant. Moreover, three of the four point
estimates of a lie in the interval predicted by the prior information
summarized earlier, and the single exception is less than one
standard deviation from that interval. To derive a summary measure
of a we tested the null hypothesis that the differences between the
various estimates of a are simply a result of random differences in
the estimators. The hypothesis is strongly accepted. The value of
23
a for the combined sample is 3.85 with a standard error of 0.76.
On the whole, then, the data and the exogenous information provide
mutually consistent information on the magnitude of the parameters
which determine a.
The most notable result of Table 1 concerns the effect of the
firmts past growth rate. Though this variable is neither statistically
nor economically insignificant in determining the firmts RD inten-
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sity,differences in growth rates account for only a relatively
minor portion of the intra-industry variance in RD intensity. In
fact, line 7ofTable 1 indicates that differences in growth rates
account for only two to four percent of this variance.
As noted, the intra-industry coefficient of variation in RD
intensity is about seven times as large as that of traditional factors
of production. There are two possible explanations. First, the fact33
that knowledge has no cost of reproduction implies that, unlike other
factors of production, research intensity will differ both because of
variance in expected growth rates and because of differences in the
extent to which firms can appropriate the benefits of the knowledge
they produce. Second, the variance in the available measures of RD
intensity may reflect a larger "error in variabl&' than the variance
of other factors of production.
The assumption that differences in expected growth rates could
be approximated by differences in average past growth results in
reasonable values of• a, but the variance in growth rates is too
small to account for a major portion of the observed intraindustry
variance in RD intensity. Hence, it is evident that a pure demand
inducement mechanism does not do well in explaining the intraindustrj
variance in RD intensity. The next obvious question is what portion
of that variance is due to error () and what part is explained by
the variance in the ability to appropriate the benefits from knowledge34
(at).
Since the estimates of both and in the three equation
model are biased if there is anycorrelationamong the factor errors,
wenow briefly describe andpresent a summaryoftheresults of
estimating the six equation model which allows for free correlation
among these errors.25
The six equation model is constructed by adding the factor
demandequations for research capital, research labor, and traditional
labor in year t -1to those same equations for year t. Each error
component is assumed to be generated by a separate stationary stochastic
process. The model allows for a x0I2O test of the stationarity
assumptions (T1), a x8/8testof the assumption of no correlation
between the transitory portion of the output error and the factor
errors (T2), and a test of the intertemporal stability of
the coefficients of the observed independent variables (T3). T1, T2,
and T3 test for consistency between the data and the assumptions used
tá identify the model. In addition, the six equation model investigates












Thenthe model permits a test of the assumption that the variance in
the appropriability parameter is constant over time (a = ), t t-l
andproducesa measureofthe correlation coefficient between the
valuesof the appropriability parameter for a given firm in two
22 2 2 2 2
different years (A akl/ak or, if = ,A). t t t-i
The observed values of the test statistics forT1, T2 and
T3 were 1.49, 0.04, and 0.33, respectively. None of these values is
surprising. It should be noted that the observed value of
indicates strong acceptance of the assumption of a zero covariance
between the transitory error in output and the factor errors in this
sample. The difference between the sum of squared residuals in the
model using all three test constraints and in the totally unconstrained
model can be used to produce a x6/36 test of the validity of the
model as a whole. The observed value of the x6/36 deviate was 0.91
which is less than its expected value under the null hypothesis that
all the constraints are satisfied. The statistic which tested
the hypothesis = onthe combined sample of four industries
t t-1
had a value of 1.61. While this indicates acceptance of the hypothesis
at the five percent level, a sample with more than two time periods
would be required to determine more conclusively whether the variance
in the appropriability parameter is in fact constant over time.36
Table 2 summarizes the basic decomposition of the variance
in RD intensity from the six equation model. Note first that the
estimates of the growth coefficient (ct)are only slightly different
from the estimates from the three equation model. Since both models
estimate a consistently, this result was expected. Line 2 provides
the estimates of the total error variance in research expenditures
from the three equation model (a2TEM)while lines 3 and 4 present
the estimates of a and the error variance in research expenditures
from the six equation model Recall that the estimates of a2TEM
are biased upward or downward as 0. Accordingly, the large
negative values of a in the second and fourth industries account
2TEM
. 2
for the fact that a is about twice as large as ain these
r r
two industries.
Line5 provides estimates of the fraction of the variance in
research expenditures that is attributable to errors in research
resourcesar/alogR. The average and thecoefficient of variation
of this fraction across the four industries are 0.09 and 0.24,
respectively. While these estimates of a/aogR provide only an
upper bound to the ratio of measurement errorvariance to total
variance in research expenditures, they do suggest the possibility
of a rather large "errors in variable" bias in micro analyses using
research expenditures as an independent variable. Auxiliary
26
calculations reinforce this interpretation.37
TABLE 2
SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF ThE SIX EQUATION MODEL
Electrical Motor
Metal and vehicles
Chemicals products communi- and
and and cations transport
petroleum machinery equipment equipment
1. a 4.10 2.62 5.13 3.49
2. a2T 0.23 0.47 0.31 1.18
3. 0.06 -0.23 0.02 -0.47
4. 0.33 0.20 0.37 0.58
5. aJO 0.12 0.07 0.08 0.09
6. rq'1ogR/Q 0.23 0.28 0.21 0.40
7. a klogR*/Q*!/0.04 0.04 0.06 0.03
8. ak/a]ogR*/Q*W 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.97
1.00 0.99 0.99 0.99




We now consider the basic decomposition of the variance in
research intensity. Lines 6 to 8 present the relevant information.
Line 6 lists the portion of the variance in research intensity
attributable to errors. One minus this value is the fraction of the
varianceinresearch intensity accounted for by the structural form
ofthemodel. The average and the coefficient of variation of this
fraction over the four industries in the sample are 0.72 and 0.12,
respectively. That is, 72 percent of the intraindustry variance in
research intensity is accounted for by the structural form of the
model and, as line 8 indicates, over 95 percent of this is accounted
for by differences in k.
One further point is worth noting. Not only do differences
in the appropriability parameter account for a large majority of the
intra-industry variance in RD intensity, but the relative value
of k associated with any given firm seems to be stable over time.
That is, the autoregressive parameter (A) connecting the values of
k and k_1 is essentially unity in all four industries.
Concluding Remarks
This paper explores the factors which underlie the demand
for research by profit-oriented firms. The intra-industry coefficient
of variation of research. intensity is much larger than those of
traditional factors. This important empirical fact is consistent with39
the theoretical argument that knowledge possesses unique economic
characteristics, and that the demand for research depends both on
the parameters of the production function for knowledge and on the
ability of the finn to appropriate the benefits from the knowledge
it generates. We propose a systematic framework for decomposing
the observed intra-industry variance in research intensity into
three components:1) demand inducement, measured by growth rates
of output; 2) a firm-specific structural parameter; and 3) errors in
the observed variables.
There are three principal empirical findings from this
decomposition. First, about 25 percent of the variance in research
intensity is due to errors in the variables and most of it is
concentrated in the measure of research capital. The noise to total
variance ratio in research expenditures Ca.JaOgR) is about ten
percent and should be considered in inicroeconomic studies using
research resources as an independent variable. Estimated coeffici-
ents of observed research expenditures are likely to be substantially
biased downward since the bias depends on the error-variance relative
to that part of the variance in the research variables which is not
correlated with the rest of the regressors.
Second, about 75 percent of the intra-industry variance is
related to the structural parameters of the model, but very little of
this structural variance is accounted for by differences in growth
rates. This result is somewhat surprising. Schmookler (1966) and
others demonstrated the role of demand inducement in determining the40
inter-industry pattern of the level of research, and Pakes (1979)
confirms its influence on the inter-industry distribution of
research intensity. We are left with a striking contrast between
the role of demand inducement at the intra-industry and inter-
industry levels of aggregation, but to explore it is beyond the
scope of this paper.
By far the greatest part of the intra-industry variance is
related to differences in the firm-specific parameter k. This
parameter is structural in the sense that it is consistent between
the research labor and capital demand equations and does not appear
in the traditional factor demand equations. Moreover, the value of
k associated with any given firmseemsto be quite stable over time.
If there are no intra-industry differences in the elasticities of
the knowledge production function (technological opportunity), the
variance in k is due entirely to interfirin differences in appropri-
ability. The industry groups used here are quite broadly defined
and there is probably some variance in research elasticities, part
of which will be captured in A definitive breakdown of o into
appropriability and technological opportunity components remains for
future research.
The more general, and we believe more important, implication
of this inquiry is one which does not depend on the specific inter-
pretation given to c1. Both the theoretical and empirical analysis
indicate that it is not reasonable to treat the demand for research41
in a manner analogous to the demand for traditional factors of
production, including capital. This conclusion is reinforced by
evidence in Nadiri (1978), in which a generalized set of factor
demand equations is estimated on micro panel data. The F(113,904)
test statistic for the presence of firm-specific effects in the
research demand equation is 121.3, which should be compared both to
the five percent critical level of 1.08 and to the value in the
traditional capital demand equation of 18.6. These results also
hold when the sample is stratified by size of the firm. The general
conclusion we draw from all this evidence is that substantially
richer models are required to provide insight into the structure of
incentives driving the demand for research and thereby to explain
the distribution of research-related growth across firms.42
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'The problems alluded to are of two types. First, errors in
R D variables make more complicated input relationships difficult
to estimate (Griliches and Ringstaad, 1971). Second, a lack of good
price and quantity indices on the separate outputs that afirm
produces precludes the use of multiproduct production functions.
points are in order. First, ttresearch capital" refers
to an aggregate of all research resources other than research labor.
Second, in this paper the firm-specific constant capturesthe
effects of "learning by doing" and of other firms' research as inputs
in tk production process of the firm in question.
3Griliches (1973, 1975) has discussed the various lags
connecting research resources and productivity. One of thefew
attempts to analyze the lag structure empiricallyis Evenson's study
(1968) of aggregate data for American agriculture.43
4Since knowledge isa produced capital input, we must make
some approximation with respect to the employment of research
resources in the pre-sample period. The data we use are for 1963
and contain 1957-1963 average growth rates. Using the fact that
research resources in American industry grew at a fairly constant
rate between the end of World War II and the mid-l960s, a specifica-
tion analysis indicated that the constant growth rate assumption was
the best approximation for our sample.
5This is a well known result whichhas been discussed by
Arrow (1962), Machlup (1962), and Nordhaus (1969a, 1969b). Patent
laws are in fact a device for strengthening these monopolies by
bestowing institutionally created property rights on the producers
of information. See Bowman (1973).
61fP1 is the profit maximizing price for a monopolist with
constant unit cost Z1, the "Arrow royalty" described in the text will
yield maximum profits if and only if P1 >P0.If the industry demand
is price inelastic over the relevant range, the Arrow royalty will be
optimal regardless of the magnitude of the cost reduction due to the
innovation. If the industry demand is price elastic, the condition
P1 >P0can be written <I(P1)J,where t denotes the price
elasticity of industry demand. It is apparent from this inequality
that the Arrow royalty will be optimal for all but the most major44
innovations and will certainly be optimal for the cost reduction
resulting from the employment of the marginal research resource.
7As Arrow (1962, P. 615) remarks: "In the absence of
special legal protection, the owner cannot simply sellinformation
on the open market. Any one purchaser can destroythe monopoly,
since he can reproduce the information at little or no cost. Thus,
the only effective monopoly would be the use of information by the
original possessor. ...Withsuitable legal measures, information
may become an appropriable commodity. Thenthe monopoly power can
indeed be exerted. However, no amount of legal protection can make
a thoroughly appropriable commodity of something so intangible as
information."
8Since the appropriability base is allowed to vary among
firns, the specific decomposition used here is immaterial. However,
any assumption on the statistical propertiesof the appropriability
parameter will be restrictive. The decompositionchosen here has
two advantages. First, it permits an indirect testof the only
econometrically relevant assumption on the propertiesof k (see fn.
17.) Second, since royalty payments, which are aboutthree percent
of research expenditures (Wilson, 1975, Chapter 3), areincluded in
our measure of output, one would want to makethe firm's output a
direct determinant of the returns to its research.45
9Since only the moment matrix of thevariables was available,
we were limited to linear combinations of the original variables
and forced to use Taylor approximations. The ratio of the
approximation error to the true value is just over two percent, and
if g is distributed symmetrically, this will not affect the estimate
of a.
"°This should be distinguished from the role ofmarket size
in models of the demand for traditional capital. The level of
investment in traditional capital is related to the expected growth
of output (accelerator models), whereas in our model the level of
investment in the stock of R D depends on the expected level of
output.
11Lucas (1967) tested thispoint on aggregate data for
American industry and obtained coefficients of the expected sign and
magnitude.
12This does notmean, however, that an increase in e raises
the optimal RD intensity since 0 affects both and
13This formulation is not too unreasonableand has the
advantage of producing a simple econometric model which is directly
estimable with the available data. The data did allow us to
experiment with more sophisticated expectations formulae which46
permit the firm to take into account both its own and the industryts
past growth performance in formulating expectations onits own future
growth rate. The results are similar to those reported here.Pakes
(1978) uses a general rational expectations formulation on adiffer-
ent data set and obtains similar results.
14The special cases arevq =0and riq =0respectively. We
have investigated a more general model which assumes differential
transmission to different factor demand equations, but again the
results did not differ significantly from those presented here. Note
also that K picks up the effect of all research expenditures that
have already gestated and are still productive. Also, we have
ignoredthe difference between E(e") and1.
15See Mundlak (1963), Mundlak and Hoch (1965),and Zeilner
etal. (1966).
16 . .
Twopointsshould be noted in connection with (17). First,
anyerrorin the assessment of revenues (e.g., differential monopoly
poweror a difference between the expected and theactual price of
output)will be captured inand will not bias the three equation
results.Second, the assumption E[c) =0is more troublesome
thanthe assumptions E(c2,c) =E(EcCn)
=0for two reasons. First,
there is a test of the latter two assumptions embodied in thethree
equation results. In addition, since research resourcesaffect47
output only after a gestation lag, if there is a production function
constraint which connects the values of different contemporaneous
factor decision errors, it will cause a non zero correlation between
and ,butnot between either or c and e c 2.. c n
17Since k. is a structuralparameter, the assumption that k
is orthogonal to the error components is roughly analogous to the
classic regression assumption of independence of the errors and the
regressors. The assumption E(k) =0,however, requires additional
comment. There is no reason to expect k to be correlated with ,
butwe can do better than rely on our intuition. If E(k)0, the
estimates of a derived from the models which rely on zero correlation
should differ from estimates based on other techniques. An assort-
ment of exogenous information on the components of a (described in
the next section) yields estimates of a which are very similar to
those obtained from our models, and this may be interpreted as an
indirect test of the assumption E(k) =0.We might add, however,
that if E(k)0, we can reinterpret a and k such that the estimate
of becomes that portion of the underlying variance in appropriabil-
ity that is orthogonal to the variance in .
18Actually,the null hypothesis of the test is -
= 0.However, under the alternative that -
acn0, the event
=willoccur only on a set of measure zero. Accordingly, we
neglect this possibility.48
19Griliches (forthcoming) provides a more complete descrip-
tion of this data base.
20The original sample consists of 883 firms. We discarded
the data for the "aircraftmissiles" and the "all others" indus-
tries. The first was dropped because it is dominated by government
financed RD (74 percent versus 20 percent in the other industries).
Our market-inducement model has limited applicability, unless it
were known that privately and government financed R F D are close
substitutes and the supply of the latter is very elastic. Moreover,
there were only 31 firms and there were inconsistencies in the data.
The "all others" category was discarded on the grounds that it
contains both intra-industry and inter-industry variance in RD
intensity.
21Actually, since value added is a component of sales, part
of is likely to be transferred to V2andthere will be some
correlation between these errors. We show below, however, that the
maximum possible bias caused by this correlation is minimal and
certainly does not warrant discarding the information in one of the
growth rate measures.
22The models presented here are a special case of a more
general class of structural equation models described by Jreskog
(1973a) and Wiley (1973).49
can be shown that if any of the measurement error in
value-added is transferred to sales, the estimates of cx reported
above are biased downwards. However, even under the polar
assumption that all the measurement error in value-added is trans-
ferred to sales, the estimate of cx becomes only 4.15 with a standard
error of 1.01. Therefore, the unbiased point estimate lies between
3.85 and 4.15.
24The elasticity of RED intensity withrespect to past
growth rates, evaluated at the sample mean of the growth rate, is
about 0.25.
25For the details of thesix-equation model and its empirical
results, see Pakes (1978) or Schankerman (1979).
26Unfortunately, we cannot decompose the estimate of into
a decision and a measurement component, but two pieces of evidence
suggest that the bulk of o consists of measurement error. First,
almost all of the errors in research expenditures are due to errors
in research capital. Since reported research includes all (rather
than only the capitalized portion) of research capital expenditures,
we (and all other investigators in this area) have a measure of gross
investment in research capital rather than the desired measure of
research capital services. On this account we would expect a large
measurement error component in research capital. Second, preliminary50
application of the three equation model to industry averagesof
all variables indicates that the error variance in research expen-
ditures in these aggregate variables approaches zero. The averaging
procedure would tend to cancel out the part of the errorvariance
caused by measurement error and by random, inoptinial choice of
factor levels, but it would not eliminate that part caused by a
misspecification in the structural form of the model.51
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